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I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1986, a ship named the Khian Sea set sail from Philadelphia
carrying nearly 14,000 tons of toxic incinerator ash.' The ship was unable
to dispose of the ash at her first destination, the Bahamian port of Ocean
Cay.2 The ship then went to Honduras, Panama, and Guinea-Bisseau, only
to be rejected.' Finally, the Haitian Department of Commerce issued an
import permit to the Khian Sea allowing it to dispose of its cargo. 4 The
Haitian Government, however, rescinded the permit after the ship
unloaded between 2000 and 4500 tons of ash., Apparently, the Haitian
Government initially was under the impression the ship was going to be
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disposing of fertilizer, not toxic ash.6
The Khian Sea returned to the United States with the intention of
returning the ash to its place of production., The United States, however,
refused the request of the ship and ordered them to remain anchored.' In
direct conflict with the Coast Guard order to remain anchored, the Khian
Sea set sail in the middle of the night. 9 The ship sailed to a number of
countries including Yugoslavia, Sri Lanka, Senegal, and Indonesia.' 0 The
ship was unable to persuade any of these nations to accept her toxic
cargo." Shortly after being turned down by the those nations, the Khian
Sea docked in Singapore absent her cargo.,2 The captain of the ship
insisted that no ash was dumped at sea.13
The Khian Sea incident is just one example of the dangers
associated with the exportation of hazardous waste. As industrialized
nations continue to produce mass quantities of hazardous waste, the need
for proper waste storage and disposal becomes more apparent. Due to the
scarcity of waste disposal sites and the increasing cost of disposal, there is
an economic incentive for companies to export their waste. 4 For example,
due to the increasingly tight regulations, disposal of one ton of waste can
cost as much as $2500 in the United States.'" The cost of disposal in a less
developed nation can cost as little as three dollars per ton.' 6 Furthermore,
as the environmental rules and regulations concerning hazardous waste in
the United States become tougher, the environmental laws in less
developed nations remain lax." The different standards of laws also
promote the exportation of waste as business and industry seek to increase
their economic competitiveness even at the expense of human health. 18

6.

Wallbaum, supra note 1.

7.

Id. at 894.

8.

Id.

9. Id.
10. Id. at 894.
11.

Wallbaum, supra note 1.

12.

Id.

13.

Id.

14. Michelle M. Vilcheck, The Controls on the Transfrontier Movement of Hazardous

Waste from Developed to Developing Nations: The Goal of a Level Playing Field, 11 J. INT'L L.
Bus. 643, 645 (1991).
15. Wallbaum, supra note 1, at 891.
16.

Id.

17.

Stephen Johnson, The Basel Convention: The Shape of Things to Come for United

States Wastes Exports?, 21 ENVTL. L. 299, 306 (1991).
18.

Vilcheck, supra note 14, at 645.

1995]

Jaffe

The purpose of this note is to analyze the international efforts
currently taking place which are designed to minimize the dangers of
hazardous waste exportation.
Section two of this note provides
background information as to why international action is needed in the
transboundary movement of hazardous waste. The third section analyzes
the Basel Convention. Section four contains a synopsis of the Bamako
Convention. Section five points out the faults and weaknesses in the two
conventions. Section six suggests recommendations as to what can and
should be done concerning hazardous waste exportation. Finally, section
seven concludes that in order for the United States and the world to control
a growing crisis, the Basel Convention needs to be amended to permit
effective implementation and enforcement.
II.

THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM
The environmental group Greenpeace estimates that industrialized
nations produce approximately 300 million tons of hazardous waste per
year.19 Although most waste is managed in the country that produces it,
the exporting of hazardous waste continues to increase. 2
The
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) estimates that the United States
exports approximately 160,000 tons of waste per year, only one percent of
the amount of waste generated in the United States.,
The United States, along with other industrialized nations, is in a
position to take advantage of less developed nations when it comes to
disposing of hazardous waste. Companies in industrialized nations are
willing to pay generous fees to developing nations in return for an
agreement to import their hazardous waste.2Y At first glance, this appears
to be an ideal market situation. That is, the industrialized nations have
capital and need a place to dump their waste while developing nations lack
capital and have the room to store the waste.2Y
Although this appears to fit the economic supply and demand
framework perfectly, the international trading of hazardous waste produces
externalities which outweigh any economic benefits. Many developing
nations do not have either the technical expertise or the administrative
capabilities to manage hazardous waste.2 The attitude of the industrialized
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nations, which has been characterized as "the path of least resistance and
least expense," compounds this problem.Y That is to say, industrialized
nations will continue to export hazardous waste to less developed nations
with full knowledge that the importing nation cannot adequately manage
the waste or maintain sufficient environmental and health standards.
Industrialized nations have been known to deliberately mislabel waste and
to mix hazardous waste with other harmless material all in an effort to get
the waste out of their country and into another.26 Clearly this practice
hinders whatever efforts a developing nation might undertake in an attempt
27
to manage the waste in an environmentally safe manner.
It is apparent that developing nations are sacrificing the health of
their people in the long run in return for capital in the short run.
Moreover, industrialized nations, who should be thinking about the wellbeing of the globe, continue to act irresponsibly concerning the exportation
of hazardous waste. The fact is this is a global issue, and only an
international agreement can begin to solve these problems.
III.

THE BASEL CONVENTION
In response to growing international concern over the
transboundary movement of hazardous waste, the United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP) organized a group to develop guidelines
to aid in the management of hazardous waste.2 The group developed what
became known as "the Cairo Guidelines."2 9 In essence, the guidelines
recommended that UNEP arrange an international meeting to develop and
implement an international agreement to help resolve the hazardous waste
dilemma.'3
Despite these guidelines, there was concern among many nations
that an agreement could not be reached due to various conflicts. 3 In fact,
there were several instances in which nations gathered to form drafts of
some type of agreement; yet, they failed.32 For example, from January 31
to February 4, 1989, delegates from fifty countries gathered to write a

25. Wallbaum, supra note 1, at 891.
26. Vilcheck, supra note 14, at 645.
27. Id.
28. Johnson, supra note 17, at 301.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Delegates of 50 Countries Fail to Agree on Draft Covering Movement of Toxic Wastes,
12 Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) No. 2, at 49 (Feb. 8, 1989).
32. Id.
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draft to be presented to a committee in Basel." However, the delegates
disagreed over some issues, namely the question of prior informed
consent.34 Third world nations wanted to have the ability to say what could
be transferred over their waters before it was transferred. Another
example occurred when forty nations gathered in Caracas, Venezuela in an
attempt to bridge gaps between nations regarding the agreement.' Jan
Huismans, the head of UNEP's program on potentially toxic chemicals
said, "There's no doubt that stumbling blocks still exist."36

One such

barrier was the definition of hazardous waste.37 Although there were
several questions about the upcoming convention in March of 1989, more
than 116 countries sent representatives to Basel, Switzerland to attend the
Convention organized by UNEP. 8 On March 22, 1989, over 116 nations
became signatories to the Basel Convention on the Transboundary
Movement of Hazardous Waste (Basel Convention). This agreement is
the most restrictive international regulation of hazardous waste exportation
to date.4' The Basel Convention's goal was to establish a global
framework for the movement of hazardous waste.' 1 The Basel Convention
does not call for a complete ban of hazardous waste exportation, rather it
attempts to regulate it. 4
The Basel Convention applies to "hazardous wastes" and "other
wastes.""3 Wastes are defined as "substances or objects which are disposed
of or are intended to be disposed of or are required to be disposed of by
the provisions of national law."" Hazardous wastes include waste streams
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Doc. UNEP/I.G.80/3, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 649, 659 (entered into force May 5, 1992)
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and specific listed wastes.45 Waste streams are not specific wastes, rather
they are general waste fields.46 Some waste streams are medical waste and
pharmaceutical wastes.47 A listed waste, which is contained in Annex I of
the Basel Convention, is a hazardous waste if and only if it possesses a
characteristic provided for in Annex 111.48 Wastes which do not fit this
profile are hazardous, for the purposes of the Basel Convention, if the
waste is defined as, or is considered to be, a hazardous waste by the
government of either the State of import, export or transit.4 9 Any waste
belonging to any category in Annex II, which is subject to cross
international borders is classified as "other wastes. "m
One main problem prior to the Basel Convention was dealing with
the definition of hazardous waste." Varying definitions of hazardous
wastes could lead to misunderstandings about how to treat a waste after
being exported. Specifically, a country exporting a waste it deemed safe
may not transfer the waste in the most environmentally safe manner.
Further, the importing country may not dispose of the waste in the safest
manner if it was told by the exporting country that the waste is not
hazardous.
The Basel Convention attempts to remedy this problem by
allowing each nation to submit its definition of hazardous waste to the
Secretariat. 52 By doing so, if either the exporting, importing or transit
nation defines the waste being transported as hazardous, the Convention
defines the waste as hazardous for exporting purposes."
In order to transport any hazardous or other waste, the Basel
Convention requires authorization from the importing nation and any
transit nations.m To receive the necessary authorization, the exporting
nation must submit written notification to the "competent authority" of the
importing nation. 55 The notification must specify the kind of waste and the
amount of waste. 6 Before the actual exportation can take place, the
45. Id. at 678.
46. Hackett, supra note 38, at 316.
47. Basel Convention, supra note 44, at 678.
48. Id. at 659.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Hackett, supra note 38, at 313.
52. Basel Convention, supra note 44, at 661.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 659.
Id. at 664.
Id. at 665.
Id.
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importing nation, and any transit nations, must give their respective
consents in writing." These nations do not necessarily have to reply in the
affirmative or the negative. Instead, they can seek additional information
from any source about the waste, they can agree subject to a condition, or
they can deny permission altogether. 8
After the export occurs, a document detailing the waste is to
accompany the waste wherever it goes. The party who takes charge of the
waste, called the disposer, must sign the document and notify the export
state of receipt of the waste and of its ultimate place of disposal5 9 The
Basel Convention further states that if for any reason the waste cannot be
disposed of in an environmentally safe manner in the import state, the state
of export must accept the return of the waste.60 This provision of the Basel
Convention attempts to remedy the mislabeling scenario in which a country
unknowingly accepts or admits a hazardous waste.
A common scenario that occurs with the exportation of hazardous
waste deals with what happens with the waste after being successfully
imported. The Basel Convention recognizes the need to provide long-term
care for hazardous waste.
In response to that concern, the Basel
Convention inserted a record keeping and reporting requirement.6 1 This
imposes upon the parties the annual duty to report all incidents dealing
with hazardous waste during the past year. Although this provision will
undoubtedly create a substantial amount of paperwork, it is paramount to
the safety of the environment that once the waste is stored in an
environmentally safe manner it remain that way.
Besides the long-term concern of record keeping, another common
issue which needed to be addressed was that of technology. As previously
mentioned, many developing nations lack the technology to deal with
certain kinds of hazardous waste. 62
This technological deficiency
sometimes resulted in the mismanagement of the waste. In an attempt to
ensure that each signatory of the Basel Convention could successfully
manage each hazardous waste encountered, the Convention calls for
transfers of technology. 3 Parties are asked to make information available
on the latest technology and to cooperate with any nations in need of

57. Basel Convention, supra note 44, at 664.
58.

Id.

59. Id. at 665.
60. Id. at 666.
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technological assistance."
In addition to these duties, the Basel Convention calls for various
general obligations to be performed. These duties include but are not
limited to the following: (1) an effort to reduce the amount of hazardous
waste being produced; (2) an effort to ensure adequate disposal facilities;
(3) an effort not to allow wastes to be exported to a nation that does not
have the ability to manage the waste in an environmentally sound manner;
and (4) a substantial effort to take appropriate measures to enforce the
provisions of the Convention. 6
Two other important issues discussed in the Basel Convention are
those of liability and settlement of disputes. As to liability, the Basel
Convention seeks cooperation from the parties to establish a protocol
which sets out rules for compensation resulting from damages due to the
transboundary movement of the waste.6
With respect to the settlement of disputes, the Basel Convention
states that the parties shall seek a peaceful method of settlement. 67 The
recommended method is that of straightforward negotiation. If the parties
cannot reach an agreement, the parties have the choice of settling the
dispute at the International Court of Justice or going to arbitration."
IV.
THE BAMAKO CONVENTION
African nations have characterized hazardous waste dumping as "a
crime against Africa and the African people. "69 The African nations lack
the technical expertise and the administrative capabilities to monitor,
detect, or handle hazardous waste, and thus they are susceptible to illegal
dumping. 70 For example, in 1988, 15,000 tons of toxic ashes were found
in Guinea. 7' In addition to their lack of skill and experience, the
developing African nations have other problems dealing with waste. Much
of Africa is subject to heavy rains due to the tropical climate. Landfills are
continually penetrated by rain, making it difficult to dispose of waste in a
sound environmental fashion.71 Furthermore, the health of many poor
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
Id. at 662.
Id. at 668.
Id. at 675.
Basel Convention, supra note 44, at 675.
C. Russell H. Shearer, ComparativeAnalysis of the Basel and Bamako Conventions on

Hazardous Waste, 23 ENVTL. L. 141, 149 (1991).

70. Id. at 147.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 146.
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towns is at risk because the poorest neighborhoods are generally located
next to hazardous waste disposal sites." The close proximity of these sites
can result in the water supply of the town being contaminated. Due to
these and other related concerns, the Organization of African Unity (OAU)
adopted the Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and
the Control of Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous
Wastes Within Africa (Bamako Convention)."
The main focus of the OAU was the Basel Convention's failure to
place a total ban on the exportation of waste.,, Although the OAU
represented themselves at the Basel Convention and signed the document,
the OAU felt that the Convention did not go far enough.16 The Basel
Convention attempted to address OAU concerns by encouraging
technological transfers." Moreover, the Basel Convention allowed for
state, bilateral, multilateral, regional, or economic integration unit
agreements which ban the import of all wastes defined to be hazardous.,'
The latter provision gave the OAU the opportunity to remedy their own
problems by entering into other more stringent agreements, illustrated by
the adoption of the Bamako Convention.
The Bamako Convention applies to all hazardous wastes that are
contained in Annex I of the document. 9 In addition to the items listed, any
waste considered to be hazardous by the domestic laws of either the state
of import, export, or transit is also considered hazardous under the
Bamako Convention.0
Also, any waste which has a characteristic
contained in Annex II is hazardous for the Bamako Convention's
purposes. 81 In an attempt to ensure that all hazardous wastes are covered
by the Bamako Convention, all waste which has been banned or refused
registration by government regulation action for human health or
environmental concern is also hazardous. 81 Unlike the Basel Convention,
the Bamako Convention addressed the problem of radioactive wastes and
73.

Id.

74. Organization of African Unity:

Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into

Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes
Within Africa, Jan. 29, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 773, 778 [hereinafter Bamako Convention].

75.

Shearer, supra note 69, at 142.

76.

Id.

77.

Id. at 151.

78. Id. at 152.
79.
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80. Id. at 779.
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Id.

82.
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considered that a hazardous waste for Bamako Convention purposes.83
Similar to the Basel Convention, the Bamako Convention imposes
various general obligations upon the parties. All parties must take the
appropriate measures to ensure that no hazardous waste enters Africa from
a non-contracting party.A1 The Convention places the duty on the parties to
monitor their respective waterways to ensure that no dumping occurs in
any water, including the seas. 5 To gain a better idea of the scope of the
hazardous waste industry, each party must report to the Secretariat all of
the hazardous waste generated for that year."M
A unique feature of the Bamako Convention is the unlimited joint
and several liability provision.87 When a country causes damages due to
any violation of the Convention, it can be penalized any monetary sanction
that a trier of fact determines.u In that proceeding, it is not necessary to
determine who was at fault for the accident that caused the loss, injury, or
damage. Instead, the generator of the waste is strictly liable. s9
Another distinctive aspect of the Bamako Convention is the
approach to preventive pollution. The Convention does not allow for any
substances to be released into the air which have the potential to cause
harm.90 This perspective is unique in that many other regulations allow
toxic chemicals to be released in low amounts. 9'
Although there is a complete ban on imports from non-parties, the
African nations can export waste and transfer waste intra-Africa.Y
However, the African country must keep the waste it generates in their
own country if it has the ability to successfully manage the waste.93
The notification procedures and the settlement of disputes specified
in the Bamako Convention are similar to the methods used in the Basel
Convention.9 The rationale for the reproduction of these provisions is
presumably that the OAU had nothing significant to add to what the Basel
Convention had already accomplished.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id.
Bamako Convention, supra note 79, at 780.
Id.
Id. at 781.
Shearer, supra note 69, at 158.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 160.
Id.
Shearer, supra note 69, at 163.
Id.
Bamako Convention, supra note 79, at 797.

1995]

Jaffe

In effect, the only major difference between the two Conventions
is that the Bamako Convention prohibits all wastes from being imported
into Africa.9" The OAU undoubtedly felt that due to the high danger
involved in the hazardous waste industry, banning imports of waste was
the only way to keep the African environment safe.
V.

THE FLAWS IN THE BASEL AND BAMAKO CONVENTIONS
The Basel and Bamako Conventions are a significant step toward

remedying the problems associated with the transboundary movement of
hazardous waste. However, both Conventions have various faults which
may prevent either of them from being effective.
One of the major problems the Basel Convention attempts to
answer is the definition of hazardous waste. Unfortunately, nearly every
nation has a different interpretation of what constitutes a hazardous waste.9
Without a clear and uniform definition of hazardous waste, there may
continue to be a problem implementing the Conventions.
The Basel Convention defines hazardous waste as wastes that fall
into one of the listed categories of wastes in Annex I or as defined by the
state of import, export, or transit.Y There are two lists in Annex I, to-wit:
waste streams and specific substances." The waste streams category only
includes general terms such as medical wastes.9 The Convention goes into
no further detail as to exactly what constitutes medical waste. The general
categories listed under waste streams leave countries no choice but to
interpret the general terms for themselves. The potential for varying
meanings given to these general categories is great. This problem makes
implementation of the Convention nearly impossible, at least as far as
waste streams are concerned.
As to certain hazardous substances, the Basel Convention manages
to list several specific items.- However, the Convention fails to indicate
how much of a substance needs to exist in order for the waste to be
considered hazardous. In other words, is the dumping of one gram of
incinerator ash into the ocean enough to bring about a violation of the
Convention? If not, how much ash would it take?
In addition to these shortcomings, for a waste to be hazardous it

95. Shearer, supra note 69, at 142.
96. Hackett, supra note 38, at 314.
97. Basel Convention, supra note 44, at 678.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 678-79.
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has to meet one of the above mentioned qualities and must also display a
characteristic listed in Annex 111.101 Some of the characteristics include,
but are not limited to, flammability and corrosivity. 102 In this regard, the
Basel Convention totally ignores any measurement methodologies and the
meaning of flammable is imprecise. These problems lead to only one
conclusion-varying definitions of hazardous waste. If a Convention's
goal is to regulate the exportation of hazardous waste, and the Convention
is not clear on the definition of hazardous waste it will be difficult for the
Convention to be successful.
Beyond the varying interpretations of the definition of hazardous
waste, the Basel Convention does not adequately deal with the problem of
hazardous waste mixed together with recyclable material. In fact, the
Basel Convention ignores the matter altogether. A fundamental question
then becomes, at what point does waste become a material able to be
recycled when it is mixed with a material that can indeed by recycled?
For example, a German company was exempt from the relevant German
law concerning hazardous waste disposal when it lawfully mixed wood
chips with hazardous waste to create a burn material.1 3 Similar types of
cases may become more prevalent because of the Convention's failure to
provide for a framework to deal with such potentially harmful situations.
The Basel Convention's notification provisions are also
questionable. While reference to a particular waste is required before any
exportation can take place, whether a country wants the waste is
sometimes a guessing game. If an exporting country describes a waste as
being a medical waste, which is all that is required, the importing country
may unknowingly accept something that it is unable to properly dispose of
safely. Furthermore, even if the most hazardous elements of the waste are
described to the importing nation, little is known about the toxicity of
38,000 of the 48,000 chemicals listed with the EPA. 1°4 In effect, an
importing country may not realize what waste they are receiving. The
potential result of such a scenario is that the importing country may not
have the resources to properly dispose of the waste.
A problem that is associated with the dilemma described above
occurs when the importing nation has to notify the exporting nation about
its ability to handle the waste in an environmentally safe manner. The
Basel Convention recognized that many developing nations do not have the

101.

Id. at 679.

102.

Basel Convention, supra note 44, at 679.

103.

Hackett, supra note 38, at 314-15.

104. Id. at 317.

1995]

Jaffe

necessary expertise to manage such waste, nor to make decisions about
waste disposal. Given that fact, the Basel Convention relies on developing
nations to assess their own ability to handle hazardous waste imported into
their country. How can the importing country accurately measure its
ability to handle the waste when, more often than not, it cannot even assess
or know what its abilities are?
A significant difficulty that confronts the Basel Convention is that
of enforcement. The Convention calls for the Secretariat to monitor
compliance.10° However, the main role of the Secretariat is to facilitate the
flow of information." If there is not a party who can monitor compliance,
nations will not follow the provisions.
Assuming arguendo that an individual or entity does exist which.
can successfully monitor compliance, there is no enforcement mechanism
available to force compliance. The enforcement of parties who do not
comply are inadequate. The Basel Convention states that parties are to
negotiate disputes amongst themselves."01 If that fails, the parties can go
before the International Court of Justice to settle the matter.1,o However,
the International Court of Justice can only have jurisdiction over the
parties involved if both parties consent to jurisdiction. 0 Therefore, all
disputes are likely to be settled between nations in an informal setting.
This type of resolution cannot, however, handle all the problems that may
potentially arise. For example, if waste is dumped outside the territorial
waters of any nation, it is unclear which nations can pursue sanctions. It
appears that the Basel Convention will be enforced only as much as each
nation wants it to be enforced.
Because the Basel and Bamako Conventions are very similar,
many of the weaknesses in the Basel Convention also apply to the Bamako
Convention. For example, although the Bamako Convention does define
hazardous waste in a broader fashion then does the Basel Convention, the
Bamako Convention still does not explain how much of the toxic chemical
has to be present for the waste to be considered hazardous. Other
deficiencies include the notification process and enforcement mechanisms
which are also inherent in the Basel Convention.
As previously noted, the major difference between the two
Conventions is the prohibition of hazardous waste imports into Africa.
This prohibition presents a twofold problem. First, if a material can be
105. Bamako Convention, supra note 79, at 797.
106. Id.
107.

Basel Convention, supra note 44, at 675.

108.

Id.

109.

Id.
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better managed somewhere besides the place of generation, sound
environmental principles would call for the material to be disposed of
elsewhere. However, the Bamako Convention ban could potentially keep
hazardous wastes away from places where it could be managed in a better
environmental fashion. Second, the sovereignty of the various nations that
are parties to the Bamako Convention are being sacrificed. That is, they
no longer have the freedom to choose whether they want to import waste
from foreign nations. If an African nation was properly equipped to
handle a certain waste, the Bamako Convention would prohibit that nation
from deriving a substantial financial benefit.
VI. THE AUTHOR'S RECOMMENDATIONS
For any international agreement to be a success, at least two
elements must be present. First, all definitions must be clear and
understandable and each obligation must be known and able to be
accomplished. Second, there has to be compliance with the provisions of
the agreement. To ensure compliance, there must be enforcement.
The Basel and Bamako Conventions both are successes in that they
have reached international agreements while many other attempts have
failed. Although there are many faults, there are also many areas in which
the Conventions have adequately addressed substantial concerns.
Given the fact that the only significant difference between the two
Conventions is the complete ban on wastes coming into Africa contained in
the Bamako Convention, the question of which Convention to recommend
is not an important issue. Certainly whether a complete ban is proper or
whether the transboundary movement should just be regulated is an
important issue. However, such an issue should be left up to the
individual nations to decide.
There are two crucial considerations which must be addressed.
First, a workable and unambiguous definition of hazardous waste must be
achieved. The definition must eliminate the current inevitable confusion
that exists. Second, there is a need for a strong provision to ensure
enforcement of the various undertakings. The Bamako Convention, with
the exception of not giving waste amounts, has a relatively broad definition
which does not allow parties to dispute the meaning of hazardous waste.
Accordingly, a central issue is how much of a toxic chemical makes a
waste hazardous? Whatever the answer is, it must be a uniform one. The
only feasible manner to resolve this issue is to make any trace of a toxic
chemical a hazardous waste. Otherwise, the question would become how
much of a chemical makes it hazardous? The answer to that question
would invariably have to change depending on which waste was at issue.
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The next issue of compliance is much more difficult to deal with.
The ideal solution would be some type of task force assigned to monitor
compliance, enforce the provisions and to prosecute violators. Currently,
no such organization exists. The reason such a group will probably never
come to being is that every nation would have to agree to abide by the task
force's rulings. Nations would be reluctant to give one group so much
power, especially if they were planning on violating the Convention's
provisions. Even if such a monitoring and enforcing body were to be
agreed upon, there would inevitably be problems with financing such an
organization.
One possible solution to funding the body would be to select a
person from each Convention member country to represent them in an
enforcement committee. All nations would have to agree to abide by the
rulings of the committee. This also might present a problem. A nation
may be more willing to give its consent to such a group only if it is a
member of the committee. Financial considerations in this proposed
solution would not be a major problem in that each nation would only be
responsible for one member of the committee. Obviously, even with an
agreed upon enforcement committee, until and unless technological
advances in detecting violators are made, the committee's impact will be
less significant.
VII. CONCLUSION

All attempts to reach an international accord concerning the
transboundary movement of hazardous waste will be difficult. The Basel
and Bamako Conventions have shown that the task is not impossible. The
next step is for UNEP to amend the Basel Convention to deal with its
weaknesses which have not become apparent.
Although the Basel
Convention does succeed in some respects, the environment is too fragile
to have an agreement that does not address each and every concern, issue,
and problem area in controlling the transboundary movement of hazardous
waste.

